green clubs, like the nongovernmental ISO 14001 (Prakash & Potoski 2006) , only promise enhanced reputation, that is, the possibility that investors, employees, and environmental regulators will look upon members more favorably (Lyon & Maxwell 2004) . Green clubs run by government, by contrast, can offer members more than an enhanced reputation; they can also offer relief from regulatory requirements. For example, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Performance Track program offers its members a low priority for routine regulatory inspections and the reduction in burdens associated with reporting and permitting regulations (Fiorino 2008) .
Only green clubs run by government can offer such regulatory benefits, so it would seem that government clubs would have a clear advantage when it comes to attracting members that meet high standards, at least compared to clubs run by other institutions. Track's experience is emblematic of government clubs more generally, why has the level of participation in government clubs remained comparatively low?
In this paper, we investigate why government clubs with the greatest benefits paradoxically have the fewest members. We explain this puzzling outcome by focusing on (a) the relationship between clubs' entry procedures and the rewards they offer members, and (b) the relationship between membership levels and entry procedures.
While government agencies in theory have the most to offer facilities that participate in their voluntary programs, in practice these agencies face a political environment that leads them to combine greater rewards with more demanding entry requirements. As Fiorino (2008) indicates, conferring benefits on individual regulated entities is a "delicate matter" for government officials, particularly when the benefits take the form of regulatory relief.
Our analysis accepts club theory's premise of a tradeoff between attracting members and preventing them from shirking (Potoski & Prakash 2008) . We show that government clubs can achieve one or the other of these objectives --high growth or high standards --but not both. As a result, unlike Fiorino (2008) who optimistically views government clubs as "a path for systemic change," we suggest at best a substantially more limited role for government clubs. Club theory and our data lead us to predict that the level of participation in government clubs continue to remain relatively low, especially when they offer substantial membership rewards. These rewards are simply not significant enough for many firms to overcome the additional demands agencies place on potential members who are to receive those additional rewards. If "clubs with few members can hardly be considered successful" (Prakash & Potoski 2006, 21) , then in contrast with Fiorino (2008) , we actually should expect very little from government clubs, notwithstanding their ability to offer additional inducements for membership.
Club Design and Participation
As Potoski and Prakash (2008) have emphasized, green clubs meet the challenges of attracting members and enforcing club standards through institutional attributes that provide sufficient incentives for businesses to join, while still ensuring adequate monitoring and enforcement of standards. Prakash and Potoski's (2006) The rewards offered to members, and the behavior expected of them to join and remain in the club, are key aspects of what we mean by a club's institutional design. To be sure, several previous studies have noted that positive inducements offered by clubs can motivate participation (Segerson and Li 1999; Davies and Mazurek 1996; Khanna 2001) . Others recognize that government can offer different types of membership benefits than nongovernmental organizations. In addition to offering technical information about ways to reduce waste and other forms of pollution (Khanna 2001; Delmas and Keller 2005) , government can offer regulatory or procedural flexibility to participating firms (Delmas and Terlaak 2001; EPA 1998) . Other government programs seek to encourage firms to undertake action that can benefit their bottom line, such as through energy efficiency or other actions that firms presumably have an incentive to take even in the absence of the program (Morgenstern & Pizer 2006) .
One reason institutional design has been so little emphasized may be that existing research has used the individual firm as the unit of analysis, seeking to explain varying firms' decisions while holding the voluntary program -or government club -constant.
For example, Khanna and Damon (1999) and Cason (1995, 1996) analyze differences between participants and non-participants in the EPA's 33/50 program, while Prakash and Potoski (2006) use a single club -ISO 14001 -as their main example.
Restricting attention to participation in individual voluntary programs has allowed researchers to gain analytical traction on the firm-or facility-level characteristics that correlate with participation. However, such an approach does not allow researchers to assess whether or how differences in program design may also influence firms' decisions.
To see how design differences may affect participation, we begin by considering three of EPA's most prominent voluntary programs: (1) the 33/50 program, (2) Performance Track, and (3) Project XL. For each, we describe the package of benefits EPA has offered and the standards it has set for entry and ongoing participation. We also describe the numbers and characteristics of facilities that have joined each program.
These three programs represent a progression in terms of their standards for participation and the rewards they offer. Although EPA has given high priority to each of these programs, membership in them has varied substantially. The 33/50 program engaged roughly twenty-five times the number of facilities as Project XL, and membership in Performance Track lies between the extremes of 33/50 and XL. EPA developed its list of seventeen targeted chemicals by asking its regulatory offices to name their high-priority chemicals. Any TRI chemical making the list of more than one office came under the rubric of 33/50. The program's interim goal of 33% and its ultimate goal of 50% were based largely on a suggestion made in an earlier report published by the Office of Technology Assessment that a 50% reduction in toxic releases would be feasible (U.S. Congress, 1986) .
Any company that released any one of the targeted chemicals was eligible to participate. To join, a company needed only to commit to reducing at least one of these chemicals --and to do so by any amount. The 33% and 50% reduction goals applied to overall emissions of the targeted chemicals, not necessarily targets for individual businesses.
EPA faced the decision of what baseline year to use to measure the attainment of their toxics reduction goals. Companies and trade associations that had already undertaken major efforts to reduce toxic releases before 1991 argued against using 1991 or 1990 as a baseline year because it might advantage those companies who waited longer to begin reducing releases. According to EPA staff, industry also wanted to make the voluntary program a success by meeting EPA's reduction goal, something that would be more assured if the agency selected an earlier baseline year. In the end, EPA used a 1988 baseline, which in early 1991 was the most recent year for which aggregate data on toxics releases were available.
EPA actively recruited companies to join the program, targeting at the outset those companies with facilities having the largest volumes of toxic releases (Khanna 2006) . EPA sent an initial batch of invitation letters to CEOs of the "Top 600" companies, which together accounted for about 66% of releases of the 17 targeted chemicals based on 1988 data (EPA 1999) . Of these businesses, 328 (64%) chose to join (Khanna 2006 ). In July, 1991, EPA sent letters to an additional 5,400 companies and followed up with telephone calls. It sent out a third round of invitations in 1992, to an additional 2,512 companies (Khanna 2006) . The businesses EPA contacted in the second and third rounds were smaller in size, had lower releases than the initial "Top 600" group, and were relatively less responsive to EPA's invitation, with only about 13% signing up (Davies & Mazurek 1996) . Out of about 10,000 companies eligible for the program because they reported toxic releases, EPA overall invited about 8,000 to participate and, by the end of the program, about 1,300 facilities had joined (EPA 1999 , Khanna 2006 ).
Perhaps not surprisingly given EPA's initial outreach to businesses with the largest volumes of toxic releases, 33/50 participants tended overall to be large, profitable businesses with large emissions (Arora & Cason 1995 , Gamper-Rabindran 2006 . They also tended to market their products directly to consumers, have large advertising and R&D budgets (Arora & Cason 1996) , and be publicly traded (Gamper-Rabindran 2006 In addition, TRI data themselves raise questions. Since EPA uses industry's own reporting, if companies devote more attention to estimating their releases they may be able to report reductions on paper that do not necessarily reflect real reductions.
Companies also can escape the requirement to report releases if they reduce their use of designated toxic chemicals to below given thresholds, a reporting artifact that may account for as much as 40% of the reductions in reported releases (Bennear 2008 (Davies & Mazurek 1996, 15) . The overall release of targeted chemicals dropped 42% during the same period, while other TRI-reported chemicals dropped only 22% (Davies & Mazurek 1996, 15) . These findings, however, do not take into account the fact that companies signing up for 33/50 may have been predisposed to reduce their releases and that the same factors that led them to join also prompted them to reduce.
Using regression analysis, Khanna and Damon (1999) If 33/50's benefit to society came from incremental reduction in toxic releases, the primary benefit EPA offered participants was recognition -literally a certificate of appreciation mailed a few weeks after EPA received a company's letter of commitment.
Companies could display their EPA certificates of appreciation in their headquarters'
lobbies. EPA also included the names of participating companies in its annual Progress
Update Reports and other publications. In the later years of the program, EPA decided to allow companies to submit "success stories" describing their environmental efforts, stories that EPA then disseminated. EPA also much later decided to cooperate with the publisher McGraw-Hill on a more selective awards program, called "Environmental
Champions," based on corporate-level performance as measured in TRI reports. The 33/50 program was officially "enforcement neutral," which is to say that EPA did not offer any regulatory relief or enforcement discretion to participants.
4
The simplicity of 33/50's joining requirements made it easy for businesses to participate in this club, but those simple requirements also made it more difficult for EPA to demonstrate the program's credibility. 33/50 failed to win the support of the national environmental community which had actively sought a stronger voluntary program that would have promoted reductions in the use -not just release -of toxic chemicals instead.
Environmental groups were also concerned that companies could reduce releases in the target chemicals by switching to other toxic chemicals or by making "paper reductions"
based on different estimation techniques rather than based on real environmental gains.
Rather than recognize companies simply for making a commitment, environmentalists urged that EPA require companies to submit additional documentation on their use reduction efforts before being recognized under this program. Although they were not opposed to the idea of a voluntary pollution prevention program, they wanted to see that the program could achieve genuine and well-documented environmental results. Overall, environmentalists have not been convinced that 33/50 had a significant impact on the environment, tending to see it as basically a public relations ploy. Costs of participation are considerably higher for Performance Track than they were for the 33/50 program. In order to join Performance Track, a facility must complete a 22-page application that asks questions about its location, size, and business sector, environmental management system, and past environmental accomplishments. The facility must describe four areas in which it promises to make future environmental commitments over the coming three years. Applications must include three community references and must be signed by a senior officer in the applying organization. EPA reviews each application and conducts its own screening to ensure each facility is in compliance with federal, state, and local regulations.
National Environmental Performance Track
Once accepted into Performance Track, a facility's membership is good for three years, at which point it must reapply. EPA's expectation is that members will make progress toward achieving their performance commitments and thus the program also requires that members complete an 12-page annual performance report (APR). The APR, which must also be signed by the senior manager responsible for the facility, requires facilities to "normalize" their current performance vis-à-vis a baseline level. EPA posts facility APRs on its website and facility managers are expected to make the report generally available to the public. EPA headquarters and regional staff visit about 10% of member facilities annually to confirm application information and assess progress toward facilities' commitments. Both Project XL and Performance Track trace their ideological roots to a set of discussions convened by the Aspen Institute in the early 1990s about alternatives to existing environmental regulation. One recommended alternative was to recognize and 7 Some scholars might well characterize Project XL as a negotiated agreement as opposed to a green club Marcus 2004, Carraro and Lévêque 1999) . Project XL did involve negotiations with individual facilities, but the program also bears an affinity with other EPA voluntary programs in that it sought to encourage individual facilities with records of strong regulatory compliance to cooperate with EPA, states, and environmental or community organizations and experiment with new ways to achieve superior environmental performance. We therefore follow Prakash and Potoski (2006, 63-65) in treating Project XL as an example of a green club.
treat differently organizations if they meet high standards and pledge to attain "superior environmental performance" (Aspen Institute 1994, 4) . While the Aspen Institute did not use the language of club theory, in essence it was proposing the establishment of a government club for environmental leaders for whom usual regulatory requirements would not apply. In addition to favorable publicity, government would provide participants "increased flexibility as to how the environmental goals are achieved" and waivers of some regulatory requirements (Aspen Institute 1994, 4).
In announcing Project XL, EPA stated its intention "to give regulated sources the flexibility to develop alternative regulatory strategies that will replace or modify specific regulatory requirements on the condition that they produce greater environmental benefits" (EPA 1995b Project XL was plagued with "process barriers" (Marcus et al. 2002 ). An EPA (1998, 41) review found that "[m]ost stakeholders commented the process was too long or much longer than they expected or felt was warranted." Negotiation of final agreements often required thousands of hours of time over many months (Marcus et al. 2002) . The average duration needed to complete final agreements was 26 months (Delmas & Marcus 2004) . EPA emphasized from the start the importance of obtaining support from community and environmental advocacy groups before it would approve an XL application, even though involvement of these groups proved cumbersome. In addition, after the applicant secured agreement from EPA, state regulators, community groups, and environmentalists, EPA then proceeded to develop a site-specific rulemaking to implement the regulatory waiver sought by the applicant, a rulemaking processed in Washington through the normal notice-and-comment procedures including publication in the Federal Register (Caballero 1998; Hirsch 1998 ).
According to an independent study of eleven of the earliest XL projects, the process of developing proposals and securing agreement imposed significant costs on businesses, averaging about $350,000 per proposal and rising to more than $500,000 in some cases (Blackman & Mazurek 1999) . The most costly parts of the process were interacting with EPA at both the regional and federal levels. Together, these interactions were responsible for half the costs to companies of advancing an XL proposal (Blackman & Mazurek 1999) . Costs to EPA were also substantial. Not counting the costs to EPA headquarters to run the program overall, EPA regional offices spent on average about $111,000 to negotiate and approve each proposal, and in some cases costs reached about $200,000 per proposal (Blackman & Mazurek 1999) . Costs were greatest for complex and innovative projects -"precisely the type of proposals that Project XL was designed to foster in order to improve the efficiency of the regulatory system" (Blackman & Mazurek 1999, 1) . Companies were discouraged by the high transaction costs of participation, time-consuming review process, and complex negotiations required with a seemingly vast array of interest groups (Davies & Mazurek 1996) .
In an effort to gauge the cumulative environmental benefits from Project XL, EPA has attempted to aggregate the environmental benefits listed in approved project proposals. Assuming these proposals accurately predicted actual environmental impacts, The benefits to the organizations that completed XL agreements with EPA varied.
Of course, as the program's name implies, EPA gave recognition to participants for their "excellence and leadership," something EPA has claimed was "very helpful in improving relations with regulatory agencies and communities and in meeting the expectations of environmentally conscious consumers and shareholders" (EPA 2001, 5) . The waivers EPA promised Project XL participants were more substantial than the regulatory incentives provided through Performance Track. Intel's Project XL agreement, for example, allowed it to reduce the time to secure environmental permits for one of its semiconductor manufacturing facilities in Arizona. By eliminating the need for a permit every time the plant changed manufacturing processes to bring new products to market, the company was able to eliminate some 30 to 50 reviews annually (Lund 2000) . Intel's cost savings were substantial, estimated to be upwards in the millions of dollars, because permit delays were a key concern for a firm producing products in the fast-paced computer technology marketplace (Lund 2000) .
Despite the fact that Project XL involved only a modest number of participating facilities, it generated widespread controversy similar to that sparked by Performance
Track and, to a lesser extent, the 33/50 program (Susskind & Secunda 1998) . For example, frequent complaints arose over the vague and contested nature of the Project's mission to achieve "superior environmental performance" (Marcus et al. 2002) . Was "superior" to be understood relative to the level imposed by law on a facility or to its actual level of performance, which could already be cleaner than legally required? If a company were already performing better than standards allowed, did it need to go further beyond compliance to secure an XL agreement? Or was it sufficient to continue to achieve any level of performance better than the regulatory standards, even if worse than before the agreement? Businesses preferred the latter, while environmentalists the former. The agency frequently found itself in the middle.
In addition, critics both inside and outside EPA charged that the program violated the law, since it was far from clear how EPA had the authority to waive statutory requirements. It became commonplace to quip, "If it isn't illegal, it isn't XL" (Caballero 1998 ). Many at EPA saw Project XL "as a threat" to the environmental regulatory system that they were charged with upholding (Susskind & Secunda 1998, 96) . Aware that even one major environmental problem arising from an XL Project had the potential to discredit EPA and all XL facilities, agency officials painstakingly scrutinized XL proposals. Environmental advocacy groups viewed Project XL with suspicion, with some apparently claiming that "XL" stood for "EXtra Leniency" (Steinzor 1998,125) .
Among other things, they feared that "business would subvert XL by offering EPA multimedia emissions trade-offs that could pose new and more serious hazards to workers and the environment" (Susskind & Secunda 1998 ).
Program Design and Participation
Although 33/50, Performance Track, and Project XL were all examples of green clubs, they exhibited striking differences in their overall design. The requirements for entry into these program varied considerably, ranging in increasing stringency from a minimal letter of general commitment for 33/50, to completion of an extensive application and documentation of multiple beyond-compliance commitments for Performance Track, to an application process followed by an intensive multi-stakeholder negotiation followed by a site-specific rulemaking for Project XL. As the entry stringency increased across these three programs, participation levels declined, from over 1,300 in 33/50 to about 550 in Performance Track to about 50 in Project XL.
What explains these varied levels of stringency? The insights of principal-agent theory should lead us to expect that the stringency of entry requirements for government clubs will be affected by the level of recognition and rewards to the participants of these programs. The standard principal-agent problem arises when individuals or organizations delegate authority to third parties (agents) to act on their behalf, since principals do not fully control their agents and agents' interests are not always fully aligned with those of their principals (Zeckhauser & Pratt 1985) . While government regulators certainly do not make participants in clubs their agents per se, they do give participating businesses something valuable, namely the regulators' imprimatur. And like agents more generally, the businesses that participate do not have interests fully aligned with the government's.
A principal whose agent shirks (i.e., exploits his discretion to pursue his own interests rather than those of the principal) will harm the principal. Similarly, businesses that participate in a green club, and thereby receive government recognition if not even exemption from normal regulations, can harm the government agency if they later are found to have created serious environmental problems or have violated normal environmental regulations.
A regulatory agency assumes a risk to its own reputation, and more importantly a risk to its standing with its political overseers and the source of its budgetary appropriations, when it recognizes a facility or firm for some action of environmental leadership. As the agency gives businesses greater recognition and rewards, it also assumes a greater exposure to risk itself. We have seen that each of the three programs failed to receive enthusiastic support from environmental organizations. Significantly, environmentalist criticisms grew stronger as EPA gave, or proposed giving, members greater regulatory incentives. Since bureaucracies tend to be risk averse, we can expect they will be sensitive to criticisms that their programs are recognizing and rewarding the wrong companies or that their claims of environmental gains from the programs lack credibility. In addition, for any given business an agency recognizes or rewards, there is at least a small potential that the business will later create a significant environmental problem or have an accident or fatality on site. Any regulatory agency that creates a club for "leaders" inherently risks public and political embarrassment should such an incident occur -not to mention the resulting legislative hearings and the potential for legislative termination of voluntary programs, their appropriations, or other political repercussions.
The underlying general problem for principals in controlling their agents is an informational one. The principal usually does not know nearly as much as the agent does, nor can the principal fully know everything about the agent's actions. This informational asymmetry gives rise to various solutions that seek either to overcome this asymmetry or to help encourage the agent to see it in her interests to serve the principal's interests. These solutions include: (1) contracting, (2) monitoring, (3) power-sharing, and (4) reversibility (Coglianese & Nicolaidis 2001) . Through contracting, principals either create incentive structures that realign agents' incentives with the principals' interests, or that delineate the authority granted to the agent so that it is defined in a way that restricts departures from the principals' interests. Monitoring refers to reporting and other mechanisms designed to overcome the information asymmetry that afflicts principals.
Under power-sharing arrangements, agents must get authorization from or otherwise involve their principals in final decisions. And reversibility mechanisms allow principals the opportunity to override agents' decisions and even to terminate the agency relationship.
When government agencies recognize and reward industry, their underlying informational problem is the same as that of any principal. How does EPA know if a business it decides to recognize for reducing pollution will actually do what it commits to do? How will it know the business will not later turn out to be (or to create) an environmental disaster that embarrasses the agency and subjects it to accusations of having cozied up to industry? The solutions for the regulator's problem are similar to the kinds of contracting, monitoring, power-sharing, and reversibility used in addressing principal-agent problems more generally. The entry requirements government imposes on prospective club members and the overall terms and conditions for participation reflect these kinds of solutions. Under Performance Track, for example, EPA monitors facility environmental performance by requiring managers to complete a relatively lengthy application, by visiting the participating facility, and by reviewing annual progress reports. It also reserves the right to end the membership of any facility that does not live up to program requirements, and it has exercised this discretion on numerous occasions. Under Project XL, EPA added a power-sharing mechanism, not only requiring buy-in by community groups and environmentalists, but also retaining authority to reject the terms of a final project agreement.
For the same kinds of reasons that underlie principal-agent theory, then, we can expect that the greater the reward an agency gives to businesses who participate in government clubs, the greater will be the stringency of the club's entry requirements.
That appears to be exactly what we observe with 33/50, Performance Track, and Project XL. The stringency of the entry requirements into these three clubs corresponds to the level of reward and recognition each program provided to participants. Under the 33/50
program, EPA simply provided participants with a certificate of membership, and so entry requirements were minimal. Under Performance Track, EPA has offered participants higher profile recognition by listing on the agency's website -as well as annual meetings with high-level EPA officials and modest exemptions on certain regulatory requirements. Performance Track's entry requirements are correspondingly more stringent than 33/50's. Under Project XL, EPA promised participants a still more substantial benefit -namely, actual waivers from substantive environmental standardsand its entry requirements were the most stringent and intensive of all. Furthermore, as
we have seen, as entry stringency increased across each of these three clubs, business participation declined, notwithstanding the changes in the level of rewards.
Design and Participation Across All EPA Partnership Programs
Do the relationships between government rewards, entry stringency, and business participation generalize beyond the cases of 33/50, Performance Track, and Project XL?
We believe they do. To assess the general validity of the conclusions drawn from these three cases, we collected and analyzed data on all similar EPA clubs that were in existence in 2004.
We began our study by identifying and reviewing all of the national voluntary programs currently administered by EPA. Product Certifications seek to promote a market in "green" products by developing standards for the environmental characteristics of these products and a process for certifying that specific products meet these standards. The part of the EnergyStar program that establishes standards for energy-efficient appliances is an example. 11 Unlike with product certification, in voluntary partnership programs the membership decision is made based on qualities of the organization, not the product. For each of the programs in Table 8 .1, we reviewed official program material describing the application process and the qualifications for membership. Three researchers (the two authors and a graduate student) participated in coding the stringency of each program's entry requirements, with differences in coding reconciled through agreement and further investigation. In cases where there was uncertainty in the written materials, we contacted EPA staff responsible for administering the programs.
We coded programs on a three-point scale for their entry stringency. Programs rated at "1" (lowest stringency) only called for participants to send in a short note or complete a brief application making a commitment to undertaking a voluntary actionmuch like 33/50. For example, to join the SunWise School Program, a school need only provide EPA with contact information, promise to increase awareness of the dangers of sun exposure by trying at least one of five suggested activities, and briefly describe how it intends to use information EPA provides about avoiding sun exposure.
Programs rated "2" required both commitment and action, such as a description of a project or other undertaking that demonstrates the participant's commitment. For example, the Best Workplaces for Commuting program recognizes companies that encourage employees to get to work in ways other than by drive-alone commuting.
It requires prospective members to complete a three-page checklist that provides information about the employer's actions to promote car-pooling and public transportation. Each year, an employer must complete an eight-page update form describing the benefits it has provided to commuters. To join SmartWay Transport Partners, another EPA partnership program rated a "2," businesses must complete a twopage application committing to use EPA's performance model to measure their vehicle fleets' environmental performance, set specific and measurable performance goals, develop action plans for implementing the goals, submit the goals and action plans to EPA, and report progress. Most programs were like these examples, in that they required both a commitment and some demonstration or declaration of action, however minor.
Programs rated "3" also require commitment and demonstration of action, but they also involved training or screening by EPA or a third party to verify the applicant meets the qualifications. The National Environmental Performance Track, described in the previous section, illustrates this highest level of stringency. Facilities wishing to join Performance Track must clear a compliance screening by the agency, meet eligibility requirements, commit to improve performance in four areas, and complete a 29-page application and an 11-page annual report. The Sustainable Futures program also imposes substantial procedural and substantive requirements on prospective participants. To be eligible for relief from certain Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) testing requirements offered to members of Sustainable Futures, facilities must enroll in a 2½-day training program to learn about EPA's Pollution Prevention Framework. Facilities must then use EPA's framework to assess the risks associated with new chemicals they plan to develop and show they are using the framework in making product development decisions. They must submit to EPA between five and ten assessments that include their views about how well EPA's framework helped in comparing alternatives and selecting more benign chemicals.
In addition to entry stringency, we also coded programs based on the benefits they offered members. For most of the programs, the benefits were basically the same: public recognition (including listing on EPA's website); a plaque, logo, or certificate; a point of contact with EPA; and access to technical assistance or educational materials. Only one program offered less than these benefits, the SunWise program, which does not even list participating schools on EPA's website. We rated it a "1" for its level of benefits. A handful of programs offered benefits exceeding the basic package, in particular offering some form of regulatory relief; these programs we rated a "3" for level of benefits.
Finally, we collected data on the number of members of each partnership program. For most programs, members were listed on the EPA's website, so we used the number of members contained on those lists as of the end of October 2005 for our analysis. Where no lists were posted we contacted EPA to obtain current data. For those programs that distinguished members based on their sector or organization type, we aggregated members from across all categories and used the total membership numbers.
The basic contours of our data are consistent with the theoretical expectations growing out of our examination of 33/50, Performance Track, and Project XL. Programs with low entry stringency do not offer high benefits, and programs with high entry stringency tend to have high benefits. Of course, as Figure 8 .1 shows, the variation between entry stringency and program benefits is not significant because more than half of the programs provide the "standard" package of program benefits and also provide a typical level of entry stringency requiring both a commitment and some action on the part of members. A few programs with low entry stringency offer medium benefits, but none offers a high level of benefits. Similarly, most of programs with high stringency also provide high levels of benefits. As expected, the degree of entry stringency is inversely related to the number of members (Figure 8 .2). That is, the average membership in programs with low stringency is higher than the average membership in those with high stringency. Even taking into account the fact that some programs are older than others, the average number of members per year is higher for those programs with lower entry stringency.
Admittedly, even though we have examined all of EPA's existing voluntary partnership programs, the overall numbers in this sample are low. The average membership level for programs with low stringency is no doubt dramatically affected by a single program -SunWise -which boasts about 13,000 members. That program, though, seems instructive: it offers no benefits to members beyond some educational materials, and despite a stipulation requiring members to participate in a student and teacher evaluation, it really demands nothing other than completing an on-line form with contact information.
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At the other extreme from SunWise lies the Sustainable Futures program. As noted, Sustainable Futures requires that prospective members send representatives to a multi-day training course, conduct extensive risks assessments, and go through EPA screening, but in exchange it offers expedited regulatory relief from TSCA testing 13 Were it not for the fact that EPA clearly treats this as a partnership program, replete with membership requirements that make the program a club, we probably would have characterized SunWise as an educational program.
protocols. Although nearly three years old at the time of our data collection, the program had attracted only three businesses that have qualified for regulatory relief.
In between these extremes, the bulk of the programs appear to be "middle of the road" -both in terms of entry stringency and benefits. The membership levels appear quite modest. The average number of members per year for all these programs is 157, with a standard deviation of 495. Dropping the programs with the highest and lowest number of members, the average number of members per year is 72, with a standard deviation of 96.
Given the sample size, we do not control for other factors that would seem likely to affect variation in membership levels across partnership programs, including: the number of firms or facilities that could be potential members; the underlying costs and benefits of the kind of environmental controls encouraged by the program; the existence of regulatory or other liability pressures that might additionally encourage businesses to undertake the actions called for by members; the degree of aggressiveness with which EPA promotes the program; and the probability of EPA taking regulatory action on issues related to the program and the costliness that any likely regulatory action would have for affected entities. We certainly do not pretend to have developed a full model explaining variation in membership levels across businesses, nor can we say how much of this variation can be explained by entry stringency.
However, there is one interesting comparison among EPA's programs that appears to be a natural experiment. The EPA's Indoor Air Quality Tools for Schools program has two membership levels: the Great Start Awards (low stringency, moderate benefits) and the Leadership Awards (moderate stringency, moderate benefits). Neither program has attracted many members, but they do target the same kinds of organizations (school districts), address the same set of environmental issues, and operate within the same regulatory climate. Consistent with expectations, the lower stringency Great Start Awards level has attracted about 25% more members than has the Leadership Awards level (54 versus 44, respectively). Potoski and Prakash (2008) have explained that effective clubs develop strategies to attract new members and ensure that they meet club standards. If industry and nongovernmental organizations are able to create clubs that meet these two challenges, then government should presumably be able to do so as well. In practice, however, government faces potentially distinctive constraints that make it difficult, if not impossible, to use green clubs to induce both high levels participation and high levels of environmental improvement. EPA has tended to design its programs so that entry stringency increases with reward. As a result, the addition of rewards corresponds with a reduction in participation.
Conclusion
This counterintuitive result appears to be a function of how government tries to manage the risks of publicly recognizing and rewarding businesses that it is otherwise charged with regulating. Moreover, it appears that EPA and business managers place different value on the rewards and information demands associated with participation in government clubs. The regulatory incentives EPA has worked to provide as part of Performance Track, for example, have been significant enough to generate criticism of EPA by environmentalists, members of Congress, and EPA's own Inspector General.
Yet for many businesses, the program's regulatory relief is trivial, if not entirely inconsequential. Some environmental managers have even told us that having hazardous waste stored on-site longer, as Performance Track allows, is actually a way to increase their risks of a spill or accident -as well as their concomitant risks of some future tort liability associated with that waste.
Although much work remains to explain the variation in participation across different green clubs run by government, the case studies and data we present in this paper show that fewer firms will assume the increased costs associated with gaining entry to clubs with higher stringency, even when these clubs promise greater rewards. Even if the transaction costs associated with joining a program like Performance Track seem modest and reasonable to an outside observer, many of those in business find completing the EPA's 22-page application and 12-page annual progress report to be a significant enough burden to lead them to pass on applying to Performance Track. In principle, government agencies like EPA could presumably increase their rewards so dramatically that businesses would flock to join, even if the entry requirements were as stringent as those with Performance Track, Project XL, or Sustainable Futures. But the present political and legal reality is such that either government cannot offer rewards that substantial or, if it did, it would need to increase entry stringency still further.
Our analysis leads to the prediction that the level of participation in green clubs run by government will remain quite modest. If government moves to increase rewards, it will also be compelled to increase entry stringency. The net result will be to decrease or at least constrain program membership. While in theory government has substantial rewards to offer businesses that participate in its green clubs, in practice it only offers strong rewards to those willing to submit to exceedingly strong swords. Few businesses are eager to accept that bargain.
